ith the increasing popularity of cloud services and their potential to be the target of cybercrime or the tool used in these activities, organizational cloud service users need to ensure that their (cloud) data is secure. Moreover, in the event of a compromise, they must have the capability and the capacity to collect evidential data. 1 To keep pace with the growth and changing face of criminal activity, some governments have undertaken measures to enhance their technical capability and allow their law enforcement agencies to conduct online surveillance. For example, in September 2014, Australian government agencies successfully lobbied for new legal powers to put Internet users under surveillance, and the government responded accordingly.
ith the increasing popularity of cloud services and their potential to be the target of cybercrime or the tool used in these activities, organizational cloud service users need to ensure that their (cloud) data is secure. Moreover, in the event of a compromise, they must have the capability and the capacity to collect evidential data. 1 To keep pace with the growth and changing face of criminal activity, some governments have undertaken measures to enhance their technical capability and allow their law enforcement agencies to conduct online surveillance. For example, in September 2014, Australian government agencies successfully lobbied for new legal powers to put Internet users under surveillance, and the government responded accordingly. 2 Surveillance by government agencies (such as law enforcement, criminal intelligence, and national security agencies) can be an effective crime deterrent. It also allows these agencies to gather evidence, monitor the behavior of known offenders, and, consequently, reduce the fear of crime. For example, analysis of intelligence gathered from different or disparate datasets (including data from the cloud and big data applications) facilitates the prediction of major impending events and identifies connections between individuals of interest. 3 However, given the advancement of information and communications technologies (ICT) and the interconnectedness of society in general, the scope and reach of online surveillance could work to the detriment of individual privacy. For example, when people upload or store data (photos, videos, documents, and so on) in a cloud computing service, they're unlikely to know the path of the transmitted data (that is, through which countries or Internet service providers the data will be routed) or whether anyone is collecting and analyzing the transmitted or stored data.
Although there's a legitimate need for cooperation between cloud service providers and governments, there are also concerns about cloud service providers now being compelled to scan or search for data "of interest to national security" and to report on, or monitor, particular types of transactional data. 4, 5 The concern generally isn't about the privacy rights of criminals or terrorist suspects, but the unintended collateral damage where the privacy of innocent individuals might be comprised (for example, the finer granulated aspects of an individual's life can be derived or inferred from the intelligence collection and analysis). It's unsurprising, then, that cloud user data privacy has emerged as a salient area of inquiry for researchers. There's a growing concern regarding the limits on surveillance, given that one can safely assume that individuals place significant value on their privacy and are against unwarranted government intrusion. 6, 7 Concerns about wide-scale government surveillance targeting cloud computing ecosystems and invasion of individual cloud user data privacy aren't restricted to authoritarian societies. They also arise in liberal democracies, particularly post 9/11. In 2013, for example, documents from the United States National Security Agency (NSA) uncovered and leaked by Edward Snowden, a former NSA contractor, indicated that the agency allegedly undertook broad online surveillance activities, 8, 9, 10 including intercepting and collecting information from non-US citizens (as well as US citizens if they were conversing with a foreign target). This exercise inevitably targeted data collection and storage organizations, such as major US cloud computing service providers. In response to the Snowden revelations, the European Parliament conducted an inquiry on the subject. 11 Members of the inquiry concluded that these programs allowed for the mass surveillance of Internet users through direct access to the central servers of leading US internet companies (PRISM programme), the analysis of content and metadata (Xkeyscore programme), the circumvention of online encryption (BULL-RUN), access to computer and telephone networks, and access to location data, as well as to systems of the UK intelligence agency GCHQ such as the upstream surveillance activity (Tempora programme), the decryption programme (Edgehill), the targeted "man-in-the-middle attacks" on information systems (Quantumtheory and Foxacid programmes) and the collection and retention of W W W.
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200 million text messages per day (Dishfire programme).
Intelligence derived from online surveillance programs is typically used in preemption responses (also known as anticipatory self-defense) designed to combat terrorism and to frustrate other criminal activities. However, the European Parliament inquiry determined that the broad NSA surveillance programs weren't justifiable and were "incompatible with the principles of necessity and proportionality in a democratic society." In addition, the NSA revelations, according to one commentator, would lead to an estimated US$35 billion being lost to the US cloud computing industry by 2016.
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Threats to Individual Privacy
Attempts to define privacy have always been problematic. 13 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis contended that the scope of privacy rights gradually broadened from the "right to life" to the "right to enjoy life, the right to be let alone, and the right to liberty [thereby securing] the exercise of extensive civil privileges." 14 The right to individual privacy is guaranteed by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (designed to protect individuals from intrusions into their privacy or private life and more broadly against the improper collecting, storing, sharing, and use of their data), and by Article 12 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (which says that no person shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with their privacy, family, home, or correspondence). However, recent intrusions such as the NSA surveillance program suggest that breaches of these international obligations are frequent. For example, in the wake of the Snowden revelations regarding the NSA it appears that overseas (such as non-EU) cloud service providers might not be legally obliged to notify EU cloud users (data owners) about requests for surveillance data. Only three years before the NSA surveillance revelations, it was posited that foreign intelligence services and industrial spies (through clandestine entry into the cloud computing infrastructure/ecosystem as part of their information-gathering activities) might not be deemed to have disrupted the normal functioning of an information system if they were mainly interested in obtaining information relevant to national or corporate interests. 4 Some threat actors (see Table 1 ) are better resourced than others to carry out more sophisticated malicious activities, although most such actors are unlikely to have unlimited repertoires. The aim is to disrupt one or more combinations of the following security notions:
• data confidentiality: data is available only to authorized parties; • data integrity: data hasn't been tampered with or modified; and • data availability: data continues to be available at the minimal operational level in situations ranging from "normal" to "disastrous."
To carry out sophisticated targeted attacks (also known as advanced persistent threats) the attackers would require considerably more resources than they usually have, and we can't rule out the possibility of some attackers being state sponsored or affiliated.
Reconciling Tensions between Legitimate Surveillance and Individual Privacy
The tension between the need for cloud security and the need to ensure individual privacy isn't new. In our attempts to address the many, potentially thorny, aspects of this contentious issue, we first need to understand this tension. Because these two objectives might also be mutually incompatible or inconsistent, we also need to understand that potential solutions will likely require significant and sometimes unpalatable trade-offs.
How do we balance the need for a secure cloud computing ecosystem and the rights of individuals to privacy against the need to protect society from serious and organized crime, terrorism, and cyber and national security interests?
Given the relatively new and changing face of cloud computing, it's important to bring highly technical expertise and research capacity, especially social research, together.
What Do We Cover in This Special Issue?
This special issue presents cutting-edge crossdisciplinary research on the topic of balancing No single public-or private-sector entity "owns" the issue of cloud security. In the cloud security ecosystem, governments can't completely delegate the role of securing cyberspace. By the same token, they can't work in isolation. 16 Vulnerabilities in a particular cloud or online environment could potentially be exploited by criminals and actors with malicious intent. Constantinos Macropoulos and Keith Martin from Royal Holloway, University of London, in their article "Balancing Privacy and Surveillance in the Cloud" echo similar observations. The involvement of the private sector in ensuring the security and privacy of data stored in the cloud is now a pivotal policy consideration. For example, the authors note that data is increasingly being migrated to the cloud environment. However, public-private partnerships aren't without challenges.
As we noted earlier, cloud security is an interdisciplinary area, requiring a deep understanding of the underlying technical, cultural, social, regulatory, and other aspects of its use, as well as intimate knowledge of temporal trends-historical, recent, and emerging developments. In their article "Data Flow Management and Compliance in Cloud Computing," Jatinder Singh, Julia Powles, Thomas Pasquier, and Jean Bacon from the University of Cambridge explain the importance of ensuring that the legal and regulatory concerns are addressed in any technical data management solution. They cite the ongoing Microsoft-Ireland legal dispute to support the need for systems, such as their proposed information flow control (IFC) system, that allow for improved visibility and flow of data within and between cloud services and cloud-hosted applications.
To ensure that cloud services and data are correctly utilized and available only to authorized parties, we need well-implemented authentication and access control solutions. 17 As a team of computer security researchers from the Institute for Infocomm Research, Monash University, Aalto University, and University of South Australia noted, although attribute-based encryption has the potential to provide scalable and fine-grained data sharing, there are several known technical limitations in a realworld cloud deployment. 18 The article "Anonymous
Credential-Based Access Control Scheme for Clouds," by Xuanxia Yao, Hong Liu, Huansheng Ning, Laurence T. Yang, and Yang Xiang, seeks to address one of these known limitations. More specifically, the authors propose an anonymous credential-based access control scheme for any cloud deployment.
With the increasing popularity of the Internet of Things (IoT) and Cloud of Things (CoT), it's important for users and the wider society to understand the privacy and security implications of using IoT and CoT devices. In their article, "End-to-End Privacy for Open Big Data Markets," Charith Perara, Rajiv Ranjan, and Lizhe Wang overview existing privacy-preserving strategies and design techniques that can be used to facilitate end-to-end privacy for open data markets. nline surveillance activities can't be self-symbiotic; they're impacted by many different factors. Although it's important to focus on individual countries or governments, we also need to look at the macro level (such as market and intergovernmental levels). The Institutional Isomorphism Theory, for example, explains that "external actors may induce an organization to conform to its peers by requiring it to perform a particular task and specifying the profession responsible for its performance." 19 In other words, institutions (such as governments) are "morally governed"-known as the "normative pillar" or "normative isomorphism"-without 
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requiring a coercive framework. In this environment, misdeeds or noncompliance are "punished" through social, economic, and/or political sanctions.
Therefore, only by working in an interdisciplinary fashion can we begin to tackle cloud spatial threats, as this quest would allow us to address the knowledge and research gaps in the existing evidence base and contribute items to fill the strategic, operational, and policy vacuum. Bringing together interdisciplinary and international perspectives will also ensure that ICT, political, geographical, socioeconomic, and legal and regulatory developments are well understood and can be used to refine policy strategies without infringing unduly on civil liberties. 
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